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Conscious Intentions: Do We Need a 
Creation Myth?
A Commentary on Elisabeth Pacherie
Andrea R. Dreßing
We experience ourselves as agents, performing goal-directed actions in the world.
In her paper about Conscious Intentions: The social creation myth Pacherie devel-
ops a creation myth about the function of conscious intentions, based on her hier-
archical concept of individual motor actions and joint action. In this creation myth,
conscious intentions are not understood as internal mental states with a teleo-
functional role. Having a conscious intention exerts a specific contribution to mo-
tor control and conscious intentions might have a potential causal power in this
myth.
In this commentary I want to postulate, that Pacherie’s social creation myth
is more than a myth but rather the search for an explanation of the function of
conscious intentions in the physical world. It tries to explain the feature of the in-
tention being conscious that endows it with its particular causal function. Yet —
speaking about a causal function — the potential analytical and neuroscientific
limitations of a causal function of conscious intentions in the social creation myth
have to be analysed with regard to the argument of causal closure and results of
experimental approaches to the causal relevance of conscious intentions. I argue
that despite these limitations the social creation myth could be an important step
on the way of finding an explanation about the function of conscious intentions, if
the question about the function of conscious intentions is slightly adjusted and is
not understood in a strictly causal way. 
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1 Introduction
We experience ourselves as agents,  performing
goal-directed actions in the world. This can be a
short-term goal of a motor action like grasping
a glass of water, or long-term goal, like the plan
to call someone later on. One crucial point in
both cases is that we know what we do or want
to do.  We are aware of  our goals  before  and
during acting. This awareness constitutes a con-
scious intention to act. Even further, we seem to
control our actions — at least most of the time
— through our intentions. We also have a sense
of agency for our actions, which is an immediate
feeling  of  control  and  authorship  (Gallagher
2005). Common sense teaches us that conscious-
ness of  our intentions seems to be of unques-
tionable relevance for our everyday acting. 
This experience raises two kinds of ques-
tions:  Why do we experience our intentions as
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conscious? What is the function of the phenom-
enal experience of conscious intentions and how
do  intentions  exert  their  role  in  our  acting?
These  questions  address  the  problem  of  con-
scious  intentions  at  two  levels.  One  is  about
identifying  the  function  and  benefits  of  con-
scious intentions for our human nature — it is
about  a  myth.  The  other  seems  to  be  above
that  about  understanding,  having  to  do  with
how the conscious intention exerts its function.
It is an attempt to find a scientific, mechanistic
explanation about the function of conscious in-
tentions in not only analytical, but also empir-
ical  terms  (see  also  Anderson this collection,
and Craver this collection).
In her target article, Conscious Intentions:
The social creation myth, Elizabeth  Pacherie
wants to elucidate the function of conscious in-
tentions and reviews teleological approaches on
the role of conscious intentions offered by Velle-
man, as well as his interpretations of Bratman
and  Anscombe.  In  addition,  she  addresses
above-mentioned question about the “how” of
the causal role of intentions. Based on her hier-
archical concept of individual motor actions and
scientific data about joint action, Pacherie de-
velops her own approach to the function of con-
scious intentions. Her idea is supported by the
consideration of the potentially striking role of
conscious intentions in joint actions (inter-indi-
vidual  actions)  regarded  as  one  of  the  major
achievements of  the human species.  Pacherie’s
idea is that conscious intentions have the func-
tion of  controlling motor action and to intra-
and  inter-individually  align  our  actions  with
each other. 
Answering the initial question of whether
we need a creation myth or not, I would like to
answer: no, we do not need a myth. We need, as
Pacherie tries to give in her target paper, an ex-
planation. What I perhaps like best about the
paper is her focus on the role of conscious inten-
tions in action, while the other creation myths
described in her paper only consider a more ab-
stract level. We experience the function of con-
scious  intentions  strongly  and  immediately  in
individual and joint action. Understanding the
function of conscious intentions in this context
might therefore be one of the most difficult but
promising approaches,  as  it  is  so  essential  for
human existence. Her social creation myth has
the aim to find an explanation of the function
and potential causal role of conscious intentions.
The importance of this approach, to my mind,
is strengthened by Pacherie’s attempt to com-
bine  empirical  data  and  analytical  considera-
tions about motor action and motor control.
In what follows, the teleological and social
creation myths are first summarized. Postulat-
ing that Pacherie’s social creation myth is more
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Table 1: Overview over the different approaches to the explanation of the function of conscious intentions
Anscombe 1963 
Epistemic creation myth Conscious intentions “provide us with a special kind of self-knowledge” (Pacherie 
this collection, p. 5)
Bratman 1987
Pragmatic creation myth Conscious intentions “[turn us into] temporally extended agents” (Pacherie this 
collection, p. 3)
Velleman 2007
Conscious intentions as a spandrel Conscious intentions are a “by-product of some more general endowments of hu-
man nature” (Pacherie this collection, p. 6)
Pacherie this collection 
Social creation myth conscious intentions “[..are] not just representations of goals but also […] a specific
set of monitoring and control processes, organizing and structuring motor pro-
cesses that themselves generate movements” (Pacherie this collection, p. 10)
www.open-mind.net
than a myth, it should nevertheless fit the cur-
rent  philosophical  conceptions  and  empirical
knowledge about the nature of conscious inten-
tions and their causal function. I therefore ana-
lyse it according to contemporary approaches in
philosophy of mind and I incorporate knowledge
of  experimental  approaches.  I  argue  that  ac-
cording to these approaches, there might arise
some difficulties concerning the causal function
of conscious intentions in individual  and joint
action, postulated in Pacherie’s social creation
myth.  Discussing a potential  solution,  how to
understand the “causal” role of conscious inten-
tions in the social creation myth despite those
limitations,  this  commentary could serve as a
complementary approach to the social creation
myth of Pacherie. I want to argue that a cre-
ation myth cannot answer the relevant question,
how conscious intentions play a role in our act-
ing, without considering the nature of conscious
intentions and thereby simultaneously focusing
on their causal role.
2 Different myths about conscious 
intentions
According to  Bratman’s pragmatic teleological
creation myth (1987), intentions are future-dir-
ected action plans, offering humans the capacity
to  “become  temporally  extended  agents”
(Pacherie this collection, p. 3). By forming an
intention, which is inert and stable, we are able
to predict the future and our future planning
and  form  the  basis  for  further  intentions.
Pacherie  criticizes  the  future-directedness  of
conscious  intentions  and  says  that  the  prag-
matic account of Bratman is incomplete, as it
leaves  non-pragmatic  and  present-directed  in-
tentions  out  of  sight.  Answering  to  the  non-
pragmatic  function  of  conscious  intentions,
Anscombe’s teleological creation myth is (1963).
Anscombe (1963) gives the whole debate about
conscious  intentions  a  highly  interesting  epi-
stemic turn; her idea of conscious intentions is
that they “provide us with a special kind of self-
knowledge” (Pacherie this collection, p. 5). Her
view of conscious intentions is that they provide
immediate knowledge of our intentional actions
as they provide an immediate non-observational
and direct access to the content of our inten-
tion.  Velleman’s  myth  about  the  function  of
conscious intentions is different (2007). He pro-
poses that conscious intentions are a spandrel
and do not have a teleological function on their
own, they are a mere “accidental by-product”
(Pacherie this collection, p. 6) of two features of
human  nature:  curiosity  and  self-awareness.
From these features arises the concept of inten-
tions that allows human individuals to under-
stand their actions in the world. Pacherie argues
that Velleman’s approach only shifts the prob-
lem of  the function of  conscious intentions to
the function of curiosity and self-awareness.
Pacherie’s suggestion is an approach based
on empirical knowledge and conceptual consid-
erations about motor cognition. The central ele-
ment is the suggestion that conscious intentions
have a function in motor control. She proposes
a three-step hierarchical concept of generation
and  control  of  motor  actions,  developed  else-
where (Pacherie 2008). Motor actions are con-
trolled in an inverse and forward model, com-
paring error signals on different levels with each
other.  On  the  highest  level  I-Intentions  are
formed, referring to an abstract goal. These I-
intentions allow for the selection of a fitting mo-
tor programme, the P-intention. Based on the
P-intention the action underlies an online motor
control via the M-Intention. 
Although  providing  evidence  for  uncon-
scious  motor  control  on  the  lowest  level,
Pacherie argues that a control function of inten-
tions cannot be denied and remains a “central
function  of  intentions”  (this collection,  p.  9),
mainly on the highest level. Unconscious correc-
tions are sufficient for small misalignments on
the  lowest  level,  whereas  conscious  intentions
are necessary in the case of large misalignment
between  the  different  levels  of  motor  control.
Pacherie declares that “[i]n such case[es] of large
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Figure 1: Pacherie’s model of intentional action.
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misalignment, error signals would propagate up-
wards,  we would become aware of  them,  and
would shift to a conscious, intentional compens-
ation strategy” (this collection, p. 10). Pacherie
also  offers  a  new definition of  intentions.  She
thinks 
of monitoring and control processes as in-
trinsic to intentions, that is, of intentions
as  encompassing  not  just  representations
of goals but also as a specific set of monit-
oring  and  control  processes,  organizing
and  structuring  motor  processes  that
themselves generate movements. (Pacherie
this collection, p. 10)
To summarize,  one  can understand Pacherie’s
conscious intentions as having a causal function.
One  step  further  Pacherie  suggests  that
conscious  intentions  have  a  coordinative  and
communicative function in joint action on the
basis of her idea that they arise through a hier-
archical action control mechanism. Joint action
between humans needs a common goal, and suc-
cess of the joint action is based on our capacity
to coordinate actions and share goals, and also
to correct and control the individual actions ac-
cording to the co-agent’s actions. Shared actions
can, in analogy to the hierarchical model of in-
dividual motor control, be controlled on a sub-
conscious low-level. In planned action, however,
a  hierarchical  high  level  of  motor  control  is
needed with which agents represent other’s ac-
tions and control their own actions according to
a shared goal. Mechanisms for joint action dis-
cussed  in  recent  empirical  science  focus  on  a
perceptual framework with joint attention and
allocentric  spatial  orientation  (Tomasello &
Carpenter 2007;  Böckler et al. 2011 cited from
Pacherie this collection). The question however,
is whether this perceptual information is suffi-
cient for successful joint action.  Pacherie con-
cludes that the conscious intention is necessary
to control intra-individual  and inter-individual
alignment of actions. One major aspect in joint
action is communication of joint goals—so the
conscious intentions  help  us  to  communicate
our  intentions  to  others  and  the  other  way
round, to receive information about the inten-
tion of others and to represent them. The influ-
ence of other’s intentions then guides our own
intentions and the following actions. 
After this overview over the different cre-
ation myths, we should think about the concept
of a “myth” itself. A myth in general tries to find
an explanation for a phenomenon that we cannot
entirely understand. There seems to be a missing
piece of knowledge, a gap, which is filled with an
idea—the  myth.  Defining  characteristics  of  a
myth since ancient philosophy are its narrative or
descriptive  character,  without  being  completely
irrational. A myth in Plato’s sense can neither be
falsified nor empirically verified (Partenie 2014).
So a myth offers a possible explanation about a
phenomenon, without making a claim about truth
and  without  offering  a  potential  empirical  ap-
proach to the content of the myth. A creation
myth about specific functions of conscious inten-
tions is developed, as they seem so unquestionable
in our everyday life, and nevertheless, we do not
understand, why we have them. The myth—how-
ever—does not necessarily need to fit the rules of
the physical world. 
The  social  creation  myth  endows  con-
scious intentions with the important function
of a structuring and organizing part in motor
action.  To my mind,  Pacherie  develops  even
more than a myth. The above mentioned char-
acteristics of a myth do not fit Pacherie’s em-
pirically based approach. She wants to under-
stand and explain the function of conscious in-
tentions, and her myth wants to prepare us for
such a deeper understanding. That is an im-
portant step, yet it brings certain difficulties.
An explanation has to fit into the framework
of current scientific knowledge. Most creation
myths  and  most  explanation  myths  make
some  implicit  or  explicit  assumptions  about
the nature of conscious intentions, so do the
above-described  myths.  To  make  full  use  of
Pacherie’s contribution, we now should begin
by  adding  constraints.  Pacherie herself knows
these limitations and discusses some of them
in her  recent  paper  (2014).  What  I  want to
add is a step-by-step-comparison of the empir-
ical  and  analytical,  metaphysical  constraints
and  her  hierarchical  model  in  the  following
sections.
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3 Conceptual constraints: The problem of
mental causation 
Folk psychology tells us that our bodily move-
ments,  our  actions,  are  guided  by  our  inten-
tions.  One  prominent  conception  of  this  as-
sumption  was  developed  as  part  of  a  non-re-
ductive approach taken by Searle. For Searle, an
action is “a causal and intentional transaction
between  mind  and  the  world”  (1983,  p.  88).
Searle distinguishes between two kinds of inten-
tions, a  prior intention and an intention-in-ac-
tion. This distinction serves to preserve the dif-
ference between an intention as a basic idea or
plan, preceding an action and an intention while
carrying out an action. If a person P has a prior
conscious intention for an action A, P has a rep-
resentation of A without actually doing A. This
is—according  to  Searle—a  deliberative  state
and represents the action as a whole. Contrary,
the  intention-in-action occurs  simultaneously
with the action, representing the actual  condi-
tions of the action. Conditions can be regarded
as certain steps, an action needs to be carried
out.  P has an intention-in-action-while  A. But,
the prior intentions are causally responsible for
the  intention-in-action  and  the  action  itself
(Searle 1983). 
This  is,  what—to  my  understanding—
Pacherie’s social creation myth stresses as well.
At the beginning of Pacherie’s paper about con-
scious intentions, a crucial point is made about
the  causal  connection  between  intentions  and
actions: “Roughly, the notion on intentions is of
a  mental  state  that  represents  a  goal  (and a
means  to that  goal)  and contributes,  through
the guidance and control of behaviour, to the
realization  of  what  it  represents”  (this collec-
tion, p. 1). Her considerations about intention-
ality are about practical intentionality, as they
concern conscious intentions in action, not only
theoretical  or  cognitive  intentions  as  mental
representations.  On  the  level  of  metaphysics,
her  statement  could  be  interpreted  along  the
lines of two kinds of property dualism. First it
could be interpreted in a functionalist way in
which conscious intentions are  abstract mental
properties possessing a causal role for our ac-
tions, in which they have a neuronal realisation
or  implementation  in  the  background  (Lycan
1987;  Clark &  Chalmers 2002).  Secondly,  it
could be interpreted in a way that declares con-
scious intentions to be non-reducible, non-phys-
ical  mental  properties,  to  be  local  instanti-
ations,  which  are  preceding  or  accompanying
our actions. This notion of conscious intentions
describes the conscious intention as a superven-
ing or emerging mental property, which has a
physical  basis  but  is  not  identical  or causally
dependent with it (Davidson 1980; Kim 1998).
These non-reductional understandings are
challenged from a variety of directions. Psycho-
physical  correlations  can  also  be  conceptually
interpreted using metaphysical models like iden-
tity theory (Feigl 1967; Place 1960; Smart 1959)
or reductive or eliminative materialism (Church-
land 1981), leaving no room for any causal func-
tion  of  conscious  intentions.  So,  according  to
the most popular models developed after World
War II, no conscious intention is a distinct men-
tal  entity  or  an  ontological  substance  in  a
Cartesian sense. Nevertheless, different assump-
tions about the nature and the causal function
of  conscious  intentions  do  exist.  To  present
these in a provocative and simplified way, con-
scious  intentions  can either  be  a  mental  phe-
nomenon in a physical world and have a causal
role  (compare:  functionalism  or  non-reductive
approaches),  or  they  are  causally  irrelevant,
since they are a by-product of our actions, an
epiphenomenon, and as such non-existent (com-
pare this to eliminative materialism). 
I now want to focus on non-reductive ap-
proaches,  as they seem to be relevant for the
understanding  of  Pacherie’s  social  creation
myth. Non-reductive approaches, which are sup-
ported by the common sense of conscious inten-
tions and intentional action, and which all sug-
gest that our conscious intention initializes the
following action, however,  might lead to a di-
lemma. As Heil and Mele put it: “We confront a
dilemma.  Either  we  concede  that  ‘purposive’
reason-giving  explanations  of  behavior  have
only a pragmatic standing, or we abandon our
conception of  the physical  domain as causally
autonomous” (Heil & Mele 1995, v). The intu-
ition that  mental  states  have  causal  power  is
opposed  by  the  rule  of  causal  closure  of  the
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physical  world.  Kim develops  one  notion  of
causal closure with the argument of causal ex-
clusion and supervenience in his essay: Mind in
a Physical World (1998). In a physical world, in
which we do not have a complete physical mon-
ism but a non-reductive physicalism with super-
venience, two premises are true: (1) every men-
tal property M needs a physical basis P, which
is sufficient for the existence of M and on which
it supervenes and (2) every physical effect has a
sufficient physical cause. Suppose M causes an-
other mental property M*. M* has a physically
sufficient  basis  P*.  The  problem which  arises
then is that M and P* as a causally sufficient
basis are both responsible for the occurrence of
M*, so M has to cause the physical basis P* of
M* in  a  way of  mental-to-physical  causation.
This result conflicts with the premise of causal
closure  of  the  physical  world,  according  to
which every physical event that has a cause has
a  physical  cause (P causes P*). Facing now an
over-determination  of  P*,  with  two  different
causally sufficient events competing for the caus-
ation of P* (M and P), and as P is causally suf-
ficient for M, P seems to be causally sufficient
for P*, and M does not have any causal effect
itself. A mental phenomenon, according to this
view, seems to be causally irrelevant. This is a
rather short version of the causal closure-argu-
ment; the whole discussion about mental causa-
tion and causal closure cannot be displayed here
(for an overview see e.g.,  Heil &  Mele 1995).
But the causal closure argument seems to be a
problem  for  both:  non-reductionist  and  func-
tional approaches. 
What consequences have to be drawn from
these considerations about the causal function
of conscious intention? Asking for the function
of  conscious  intentions,  the  different  creation
myths face the problem of causality in a differ-
ent way. Both the pragmatic (Bratman) and the
epistemic (Anscombe) creation myths are set on
a  rather  abstract  mental  level  of  description.
Now, coming back to the two-level distinction of
intentions  introduced  by  Searle,  both  teleolo-
gical  myths  are  about  prior  intentions.  One
could say that neither teleological myths require
any assumptions about causality, as they do not
involve  a  mind-world  directed  causality,  but
rather  an  intra-mental  causality.  In  the  prag-
matic  creation  myth,  intentions  are  preceded
and followed by other intentions or intentions to
act. Intentions are merely theoretical intentions
as they only have a representational character.
We can think of the pragmatic creation myth
without any real action going on, as an abstract
framework for an explanation of the existence of
conscious  intentions.  The  epistemic  creation
myth does not affect the debate about mental
causation either. As only a correlation between
conscious intention and action is necessary for
the epistemic creation myth, it only draws con-
clusions about self-awareness and does not make
any claim about a causal relation of this self-
awareness and an action. In Vellemann’s view,
conscious  intentions  are  a  spandrel,  a  by-
product. This model does not imply any explicit
claim about causality either. One could go even
one step further and postulate that these myths
only address the structure of phenomenological
experience of conscious intentions and not the
intention itself.
In  Pacherie’s  social  creation  myth,  one
cannot  deny a  causal  role  of  conscious  inten-
tions any more. This is what I outlined above,
referring  to  Pacherie’s  definition  about  con-
scious  intentions.  Intentions  are  not  “just”  a
representation of abstract goals, but of ongoing
control and they structure motor processes and
“themselves generate movements” (Pacherie this
collection, p. 10). Even more, if conscious inten-
tions are needed to modify a joint action, the
perception of goal-directed movements of others
leads to a mental representation of this action
and the formation of a conscious intention for
another action follows from this. The problem
with  conscious  intentions  in  Pacherie’s  social
creation myth could arise when we understand
—as outlined above—the I-Intention as purely
functional or supervening mental properties in a
non-reductive metaphysical framework. Regard-
ing Searle’s distinction between prior intentions
and  intentions-in-action,  I  assume  that  in
Pacherie’s  model  the I-intentions could be re-
garded as  prior intentions and the P- and M-
intentions  rather  correspond  to  intentions-in-
action. To be more precise in this comparison
we should talk about the experience of an inten-
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tion as conscious mental representation (I-inten-
tion). As outlined above, one major analytical
constraint against this understanding is the ar-
gument of causal closure. If the conscious inten-
tion (the I-intention) as a mental phenomenon
or a mental representation has a causal function
in action, we have to accept downward causa-
tion to understand this (which would be against
the rule  of  causal  closure).  If  the I-intentions
only  supervenes  or  emerges  from its  neuronal
activity, or is identical with it, then the inten-
tion  as  a  conscious  mental  representation  is
causally  irrelevant  and  not  necessary  for  the
function of motor control. My claim here is that
Pacherie’s social creation myth needs the causal
function of conscious intentions as mental rep-
resentations to work. Yet requires that we ac-
cept the idea of mental causation. As long as
the social creation myth is only a myth, we can
break the rules of causal closure easily and just
offer the gist or general structure of a potential
explanation about the function of conscious in-
tentions. Yet if the myth is an explanation, it
has to fit  the rules  of  causal closure,  and we
have to reconsider either the myth or our un-
derstanding of causal closure. Last, we could try
to create a myth fitting our physical knowledge,
yet have to deny the causal effect of the con-
scious intentions in motor control. 
4 Empirical constraints: Current 
neuroscientific knowledge about the 
status of conscious intentions 
The question about the function of conscious in-
tentions cannot be answered by conceptual con-
siderations alone. The status of practical con-
scious intentions can be analysed in motor ac-
tion—as it is done by Pacherie as well—but not
only  on  the  level  of  theoretical  hierarchical
models of motor initiation and control but on a
mere neurophysiological level. Let’s begin with
a  classical  example—the  Libet-experiments
(Libet et al. 1983, 1985) and their modified ver-
sions by Haggard & Eimer (1999). Libet and his
colleagues designed an experiment to investigate
the  temporal  connection  between  a  voluntary
motor activity and the conscious decision—the
conscious  intention—for  this  action.  They  in-
structed their test persons to voluntarily move
their hand and to detect the time at which the
urge  or  the  conscious  intention  to  move  their
hand developed. In parallel, muscle activity was
detected via electromyography (EMG) and the
readiness potential, a neuronal potential at the
beginning of a motor action, was recorded using
electroencephalography  (EEG).  Libet  and  his
colleagues found that the readiness potential can
be detected in average 350ms earlier than the
test persons experienced the  urge to move and
postulated that according to this finding the de-
cision to move cannot be causally responsive for
the action due to a time-based difference. One
interpretation of the experiments is  that neur-
onal activity (the readiness potential for the mo-
tor activity) occurs before the conscious know-
ledge of the action itself. So, the conscious inten-
tion itself cannot be responsible for a volitional
motor action as it occurs later than the subcon-
scious neuronal changes. These findings initiated
an  on-going  debate  about  the  connection
between motor activity and the being conscious
about  this  activity,  with  many  neuroscientists
supporting  the  initial  hypothesis.  Haggard &
Eimer detected a lateralized readiness potential
(1999). Libet’s experiment has been replicated in
various  alternations,  supporting  the  view  that
conscious intentions follows pre-conscious brain
activity  fitting  to  the  movement  (Trevena &
Miller 2002;  Siguru et  al. 2004;  Rigoni et  al.
2011). Similar results were shown for the inhibi-
tion of  an action (Filevich et al. 2013).  fMRI
studies (Lau et al. 2004; Soon et al. 2008; Hag-
gard 2008)  and transcranial  magnetic  stimula-
tion-studies postulated a neuronal preceding to
motor action similar experimental paradigm (for
reviews see Haggard 2005; Shields 2014). One re-
cent fMRI-study for example, reported successful
prediction of  free choices (addition or subtrac-
tion) in the study persons due to fMRI data ana-
lysis (Soon et al. 2013). Even single-cell record-
ing in humans—as an objective approach to the
self-initiated  action—detected  neuronal  recruit-
ment prior to the intention to act (Fried et al.
2011). The conclusion of above-mentioned exper-
iments frequently is, that the conscious intention
of a movement is either an illusion or a post-hoc
attribution, generated by the movement itself. 
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On a  conceptual  level,  there  exist  other
models  about  conscious  motor control  besides
Pacherie’s  hierarchical  model.  An  important
idea is the idea of intentional binding (Haggard
et al. 2002), where an intentional action is caus-
ally linked with a certain sensory outcome. In
this case, the action and its subsequent effect
are perceived as being closer together in time,
this  generates  the  phenomenology  of  causing
and  independently  originating  the  action,
without an actual causal function of  the con-
scious  intention.  Another  current  neurobiolo-
gical theory of motor control is often referred to
as comparator model (Frith et al. 2000). Every
action consists of two kinds of representations:
inverse  models  that  specify  motor  commands
according  to  sensory  perception  and  forward
models  that  represent  the  predicted  sensory
consequences of the movement. When a compar-
ator  signals  that  the  sensory  consequences  of
the movement match those predicted by the for-
ward model, we experience this action as con-
sciously intended. Here again, the conscious in-
tention is not causally responsible  for the ac-
tion. 
Transferred  to  the  terminology  of  inten-
tions,  this  interpretation  could  mean  that  a
prior intention (or I-intention) cannot be caus-
ally responsible for an intention-in-action (lower
level intention) as the neuronal activation pat-
tern for the prior intention was earlier detected
than the  intention was  reported as conscious.
What would be the conclusion regarding the so-
cial creation myth? As a conscious intention it-
self—according  to  the  above  mentioned  inter-
pretation—is  not  regarded  to  be  causally  re-
sponsible for the initiation of a motor activity
(only the subconscious neuronal activity is re-
sponsible)  the conscious mental  representation
of a motor activity in individual or joint action
is not causally involved in the processes of mo-
tor control. The function of conscious intentions
in the social creation myth either stays a myth,
as it contradicts the empirical findings, or the
myth fits the nature of conscious intentions and
we have to reconsider the interpretation of the
experiments. 
To support  the later  alternative,  one re-
cent study using transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion, a method which allows generating move-
ments by transcranial stimulation of the neur-
ons of the motor cortex, postulated that motor
activity is initiated by conscious intentions. A
transcranial stimulus was set in the right motor
cortex  and  introduced  a  tiny  muscle  twitch,
only recordable by EMG. When test persons in-
tended  to  move  their  left  hand  prior  to  the
transcranial  stimulus,  the  transcranial-induced
involuntary movement induced a stronger  vis-
ible  motor  response.  The  authors  postulated
that the conscious intention prepares volitional
motor actions by increasing the excitability of
the cells in the motor cortex that can produce
the movement intended (Zschorlich &  Köhling
2013).
There are further some major limitations
to the studies, e.g., the subjectivity of the re-
port of the urge to move, and the highly artifi-
cial/constructed experimental situation in which
the intentional action is carried out. One com-
mon objection against an interpretation of the
data in the way of Libet and colleagues is that
conscious intentions (e.g., the  prior intentions)
are not comparable to the urge to move in an
experimental setting but rather are comparable
to the decision to participate in the whole ex-
periment. The urge to move would rather be an
intention-in-action and by this not comparable
to a conscious deliberation about an action. Fol-
lowing from the data, a conscious intention is
unnecessary  or  irrelevant  (as  it  occurs  “too
late”) in conscious motor initiation and control
could be a too far-reaching conclusion. 
5 The problem of causality and the 
search for a new myth
The aims of the commentary were first to un-
derstand, why Pacherie’s social creation myth is
more than a myth. Second, I elucidated whether
it could, in principle, lay the foundations for an
explanation  based  on  and  in  line  with  philo-
sophical  and experimental  ideas about mental
causation.  This  discussion  was  based  on  the
more general question: do conscious intentions
have  a  causal  function  in  the  world?  To  my
mind this question cannot yet be answered con-
clusively,  at  least  according  to  our  current
Dreßing, A. R. (2015). Conscious Intentions: Do We Need a Creation Myth? - A Commentary on Elisabeth Pacherie.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 29(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570849 8 | 12
www.open-mind.net
knowledge. Postulating a lack of causal function
of conscious intentions, as based on analytical
considerations and empirical data, might be the
only possible solution of the problem. The argu-
ment from causal closure postulates that a con-
scious  intention  as  a  mental  phenomenon  is
causally irrelevant, because it is not needed to
explain a following physical phenomenon. The
experimental data might suggest that an inten-
tion becomes conscious only after the neuronal
activity is detected. Yet, there still is the strong
experience  of  a  causal  function  for  our  beha-
viour. 
Now, I  want to summarize the problems
for the social creation myth, based on the above
mentioned  discussion  and  I  want  to  consider
possible  ways  to  keep  and  develop  the  social
creation myth as a potential explanation about
the function of conscious intentions. The general
question about the function of experienced con-
scious  intentions,  as  Pacherie puts  it,  is  the
question about “the normative sense, in which
having these functions confers benefits on inten-
tion-forming creatures that explains why these
creatures have this capacity” (this collection, p.
1). This general question is one of the interpret-
ation and explanation of human nature and not
a question about causality. The creation myths
of Bratman and Anscombe mainly address the
question of why we experience our intentions as
conscious and goal directed. The question about
real-world, physical causality seems unessential
for a pragmatic or epistemic benefit for our be-
ing and self-awareness,  because the pragmatic
or  epistemic  benefit  of  conscious  intentions
arises from the experience of a conscious inten-
tion and not from its causal effect. The inten-
tions  remain  theoretical  intentions  or  mental
representations  and  no  downward  causality  is
needed. This does not mean that they cannot
have a specific and more complex function, but
a strong claim about a localized control-func-
tion in motor action is simply not possible. In
addition, the epistemic and the pragmatic cre-
ation myth as well as conscious intentions con-
sidered  as  a  spandrel  remain  “narrative”  ac-
counts and even if they would break the causal
closure  of  the  physical  world,  this  would  not
matter in the context of a myth. 
Pacherie’s social creation myth first seems
to  be  of  a  similar  kind,  explaining  human
nature and human interaction on the basis of
mutual  representation  of  others’  actions  and
formation of joint actions, which do not neces-
sarily  have  to  be  causal  for  joint  action,  but
only for communication intentions and our un-
derstanding  joint  action.  The  social  creation
myth is  based on the conceptual,  hierarchical
model  of  motor  initiation  and  control.  It  ex-
plains conscious intentions not only in a teleolo-
gical way, but in an analytical way. It is about
practical  intentionality.  Yet,  this  confronts  it
with  neuroscientific  findings  and  philosophical
considerations about causality: 
• Conscious intentions in Pacherie’s social cre-
ation myth exert an organizing and structur-
ing function in the motor process and there-
fore might have a causal function. 
• According to standard metaphysical  models
for psychophysical relations, the conscious in-
tentions in the myth could be interpreted as
a non-reducible mental phenomenon. But if
this is the right interpretation, we are con-
fronted with the argument of causal closure
and they are either causally irrelevant or we
have to deny causal closure of the world.
• According  to  neuroscientific  data,  we  only
know little about the nature of conscious in-
tentions,  yet  nevertheless  we have a strong
general trend underlying empirical research, a
trend that increasingly supports the assump-
tion of  a  generation of  the wanting or  the
urge to move from neuronal activation, simul-
taneously or after, but not prior to the move-
ment.
What does this  mean for the social  creation
myth?  Regarding  the  outlined  considerations
about causality, the problem of the social cre-
ation myth about the function of conscious in-
tentions  can  be  solved  in  different  ways.
Either  we could regard it  as  a  myth in line
with the teleofunctional creation myths, only
trying  to  answer  the  “why”-question  about
conscious  intentions  and  leaving  questions
about causality aside. This could sidestep the
problem of causality in an easy yet unsatisfy-
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ing way. But if we stick to a myth without ac-
knowledging the physical rules of the world we
live in,  then we will  never  achieve more de-
tailed  knowledge  about  the  nature  and  the
function of conscious intentions. There will be
no epistemic progress after the formulation of
the myth itself.
Or we try to preserve Pacherie’s approach
and keep searching for an explanation about the
function  of  conscious  intentions.  Yet,  if  con-
scious intentions have a structuring and organ-
izing function in individual and joint motor ac-
tion but—according to the common interpreta-
tion of above mentioned empirical data—cannot
have distinct causal function, how else can the
function be described? 
One possible  solution is,  that  we might
have to overcome the problem of causality in
another  way.  Most  interpretations  of  neuros-
cientific experiments and the analytical argu-
mentation  of  causal  closure  are  based  on  a
temporal, linear one-way causality in the way
that A causes B because A precedes B. Addi-
tionally,  one  single  intention  is  typically  re-
garded as the cause of the action in a quasi-
linear model. My claim is that the common in-
terpretation  that  a  conscious  intention—qua
being conscious—can only be causally relevant
if the conscious intention precedes the motor
action,  has to be revised.  A first  motivation
for this claim is the fact that there are mul-
tiple  theoretical  and practical  limitations re-
garding  the  experiments  themselves  (e.g.,
Mele 2011;  Radder &  Meynen 2012;  Pacherie
2014).
But  even if  the  common conceptual  in-
terpretation was right, there might be a fur-
ther terminological problem. In the whole de-
bate about conscious intentions in the social
creation myth, we seem to assume that there
must be a certain effect of the being conscious
of the intention.  Because an intention is con-
scious,  it  has  an  effect  to  align  and  control
motor action. If it was not conscious, it would
not have this effect. To overcome these prob-
lems in the debate of the function of conscious
intentions,  I  suggest that a different concept
of causation should be considered. This altern-
ative refers to a parallel generation of a con-
scious intention and movement planning. As it
is a parallel process and we might be confron-
ted with two aspects of one and the same pro-
cess, the conscious intention neither precedes
nor follows the action generation, but occurs
simultaneously and both are influenced recip-
rocally (Desmurget 2013). Even further steps
may have to be taken. It has been postulated
that  we cannot  trace  back the  motor  action
onto one I-Intention in a linear  model  or to
one  single  place  of  neuronal  activity  in  the
brain. We rather face a semi-hierarchical, par-
allel and dynamic network from which the mo-
tor  action  arises,  without  single,  identifiable
conscious intentions in a direct line of causal-
ity but rather fluctuacting activity (Schurger
2014).  This  would  mean  that  various  inten-
tions  exist  and  each  of  them  can  influence,
control and generate motor action on a neur-
onal  level  in  parallel,  these  intentions  are
among others generated through the observa-
tion and interaction with others. Multiple goal
representations might form a context for each
other.  On a conceptual  level  there would be
different I-intentions and different motor pro-
grammes going on at the same time. But let
us assume that only some of these I-intentions
are conscious. Being conscious, for Pacherie, is
a necessary condition to exert a motor func-
tion  and to  align  actions  with  others;  being
conscious  is  necessary  for  the  causal  role  in
her creation myth. Maybe the function of be-
ing conscious could exert a certain weight to
an I-intention, not in the way of a linear caus-
ality  but  in  a  way  of  dynamic  modelling  a
given social context. 
This could save the social  creation myth
and  sheds  new  light  on  the  interpretation  of
neuroscientific  findings.  Whether  or  not  this
move answers the question about the function
of conscious intentions remains open. The aim
should  be  to  further  integrate  the  analytical
definitions  of  mental  phenomena  and  mental
causation  into  neuroscientific  research  about
conscious intentions and try to find a working
definition and a concept of what a conscious in-
tention is like. The focus should be on the func-
tion of practical conscious intentions and ana-
lyse their causal role and function for the hu-
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man nature on a neuronal level. Maybe future
attempts to arrive at a satisfactory explanation
should try to address the causal power of a con-
scious intention  while being conscious and not
because of being conscious. 
6 Conclusion 
So, do we need a creation myth after all? One
thing  is  certain:  conscious  intentions  unques-
tionably  exist  in  our  experience.  We  have  at
least the phenomenal experience of a conscious
intention in our acting. As conscious intentions
seem so relevant for our human nature we do
need a  myth about  them.  But  we need  even
more.  Pacherie’s  social  creation  myth  to  my
mind is more than a myth; it is one approach,
which  combines  empirical  knowledge  with  a
myth about the function and its history. I have
only analysed the question of causality from an
empirical  and metaphysical  point of  view and
its  relevance  for  the  social  creation  myth.  In
conclusion, we might have to satisfy some fur-
ther analytical  and empirical  constraints.  Yet,
just denying any function of the experience of
conscious intentions due to some experimental
data or analytical considerations seems prema-
ture. A possible solution could be the reconsid-
eration of the concept of causality, to find an
explanation of the function of conscious inten-
tions in individual and joint action. Maybe the
creation  myth and the  experimental  approach
have to be adjusted and be brought together in
concept and content, in order to understand the
deeper  function  of  conscious  intentions.  The
search  for  a  creation  myth  should  start  with
creation facts. These facts should help us to elu-
cidate why and how intentions are conscious or
at least achieve their phenomenal character, to
define the neural correlates or neural correlation
in  terms  of  self-organizing,  dynamic  networks
underlying conscious intentions and the causal
function in human action, without the limita-
tions of temporal or linear causality and in a
more realistic framework of intentional action.
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